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Creative Computing and the Re-Configuration 
of Dance Ontology 
Hetty Blades 
King’s College London 
1D Chesham Building 
Strand, London. WC2R 2LS 
hetty-rose.blades@kcl.ac.uk 
This paper assesses the impact of the Choreographic Language Agent and the Digital Dance 
Archives on dance ontology. Enhanced visualisation - afforded by digital technology – impacts on 
the essential ontological features of dance, such as ephememerality and the human body. 
Referring to the work of Nelson Goodman (1968) and Martin Heidegger (1977), I discuss the 
significance of creative programming for dance, asking what such tools reveal about the ontology 
of the form and existing concepts of movement, notation and embodiment. 
Dance Ontology Digital Reveal Embody  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between dance and computers is 
complex: whilst computers provide informative and 
useful tools for the creation, experience and 
documentation of dance, they also contain features 
that are in direct contradiction to the essence of the 
form. Technology - with its dismissal of the body, its 
permanence and its repetitious nature, is a 
phenomenon in polar opposite to the ephemeral, 
fleshy experience of human movement. However, 
the two are increasingly interacting in 
choreography, performance and documentation. In 
fact, some level of technological involvement is 
commonplace in the production of every work. 
Throughout history, technology has always been 
involved in the creation of dance works - not only 
by providing lighting and music, but also allowing 
for the recording of dances – which is by no means 
a new phenomenon. In recent years we have seen 
dance practitioners using computers in increasingly 
creative ways. New technologies are frequently 
used in live performance. Projections, time delay 
and immersive technologies are being adopted by 
mainstream companies such as The Royal Ballet 
(2012), as well as experimental performance 
practitioners like Stelarc (1980 – 2012). Each new 
way that dance and technology interact impacts on 
the nature of the form. By considering this impact, 
we are able to discover essential characteristics of 
dance. Technology simultaneously changes and 
reveals the dance’s ontology. I will consider this 
affect on dance as an action associated with 
movement, and on the nature of the dance ‘work’.   
In A Question Concerning Technology (1977), 
Martin Heidegger suggests the “the essence of 
technology is by no means anything technological” 
He claims that technology is neither merely a 
means to an end, nor a simply human activity, but 
rather “a means and a human activity”.. He 
suggests that technology reveals something about 
humans, therefore the ‘essence’ he refers to is 
human, as opposed to technological. With this in 
mind, I will examine tools developed in order to 
visualise certain characteristics of dance; and 
analyse the ontological characteristics that such 
systems reveal. Heidegger claims that 
“[i]nstrumentality is considered to be the 
fundamental characteristic of technology” 
(Heidegger 1977); however deeper enquiry into 
technology suggests that “[i]he possibility of all 
productive manufacturing lies in revealing” 
(Heidegger 1977) I intend to ask; what do 
visualisation tools, designed for instrumentality in 
fact reveal? By assessing the impact of this 
software on dance ontology, we are forced to 
examine its perceived ontological features. 
Characteristics of movement previously considered 
crucial to ontology are challenged by new 
technology. For example, I will assess the role of 
the body in the act of embodiment. The term 
‘embody’ is used in dance discourses to describe 
the act of internalising a given stimulus, or meaning 
‘in the body’. Embodiment and dance is widely 
discussed (Laban & Ullman 1950, Klemola 1991, 
Sheets-Johnstone 2011, Block and Kissell 2001), 
with general usage concerning a certain being-ness 
with and of the body. I will consider the possibility of 
non-bodily embodiment, asking if computers can 
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embody movement. The term is defined broadly in 
the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2008) as to, 
“give tangible or visible form of an idea or quality”. 
This makes no mention of the body, suggesting that 
the body is not definitively crucial to the term. If the 
body is not required for embodiment, and electronic 
visualisations are able to embody movement, the 
ontological significance of the body in 
choreography is called into question. 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the ontological 
impact of computer programs designed to make 
visual (or ‘reveal’) certain components of dance 
movement and performance. I will concentrate on 
two examples of computer programs developed in 
2011, specifically for dance. Initially I will consider 
the Choreographic Language Agent (CLA), before 
considering how the issues raised by this system 
relate to the philosophical problems posed by the 
Digital Dance Archives (DDA). 
2. ONTOLOGY AND DOCUMENTATION 
For many reasons dance is a complicated art-form 
to discuss. Traditionally it exists only in the moment 
of performance. Unlike plays and musical works, 
dance works generally possess no text or score. 
Without permanent material presence, works are 
reliant upon human enactment in order to 
physically exist. Therefore the form possesses 
complex existential characteristics. Whether or not 
works exist outside of instantiation is a problematic 
issue. Whilst they don’t exist physically when they 
are not being performed, we are able to remember, 
discuss and re-stage works. Therefore they 
continue to exist in an abstract form. Reliance upon 
human instantiation means that they are only ever 
physically present temporarily, unlike paintings, 
sculptures, and even plays (which have material 
texts to which we can permanently refer). The 
ephemeral nature of dance is considered to be 
crucial to the form (McFee 1992, Phelan 1993), yet 
it provides problems when it comes to discussing 
and analysing dance, as we have no physical 
object to refer to. Therefore the documentation of 
dance through recording, photographs and written 
notes has always been important.  However 
documentation creates philosophical problems. 
Graham McFee claims that “the work of art is 
encountered only when one attends a performance, 
for only then is the work instantiated. In particular, 
one is not confronted with a work of art when one 
confronts only a notated score or a film or video” 
(1992). However; if only a live performance can be 
a true token of the work, what are documentations? 
And how do they relate to the abstract work? 
 
The evolution of technology is affecting 
documentation and creation. It is increasingly easy 
to record footage. We are also now able to see 
many more details through HD technology and 
multi-camera filming. The World Wide Web also 
provides a vast arena for sharing and storing 
recordings and other documentations, meaning that 
accessibility to works has been revolutionised. We 
can now see almost any work whenever we want, 
without having to attend a theatre, or visit an 
archive. Technology is also being used by many 
choreographers as a key component to works, with 
artists such as Sarah Rubidge dedicating their 
careers to experimenting with technologies in live 
performance. Software is also being developed for 
use in the studio. Digital technology and the 
Internet allows for the creation of multiple types of 
performance artifacts. The electronic images 
created and stored by computers possess 
ontological significance. They provide access to the 
work, albeit through a different mode to the live 
performance. 
 
Creating and using dance specific software is also 
not a new phenomenon - as long ago as 1986 
Merce Cunningham was developing and working 
with Life Forms (Schiphorst 1986). This program 
allowed Cunningham to create movement on a 
computer, using representations of bodies. William 
Forsythe, amongst others, has also used innovative 
programming to visualise the structures of his 
choreography (Forsythe 2009). Each approach tells 
us something about the essence of dance. By 
analysing the priorities of the programs, and the 
visualisations created, ontological details become 
apparent; further enhancing our understanding of 
this complex form. 
 
The CLA was developed in 2011 by choreographer 
Wayne McGregor of Random Dance and the 
OpenEndedGroup, Mark Downie (OEG), Nick 
Rothwell (CASSIEL), Alan Blackwell and Luke 
Church. This program was built using Field 
software, developed specifically for digital art 
(Open Ended Group 2012). The CLA was 
developed as part of a larger project that aimed to 
understand the mental and physical processes 
involved in choreography and to use this 
understanding to develop software that is able to 
aid and augment the creative process (DeLahunta, 
2009). The system is intended to serve as an 
“extended interactive notebook” (2009). DeLahunta 
suggests that the choreographer’s notebook is 
employed as “a toolkit for self-
reflection/examination, for the collective 
documenting and sharing of creative ideas, scripts 
and scores, capturing the dynamics of gesture and 
recording notes for future reference.” (DeLaHunta  
et al 2004). The program allows the choreographer 
to explore visualisations of shapes, structures and 
directions on a screen; these sketches are then 
animated by the program and act as a stimulus for 
movement. The images created are abstract, as 
opposed to avatars or human figures. Many 
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questions are raised by this program; its active role 
in the choreographic process presents an altered 
mode of production for dance. Furthermore, 
documentation of the creative and cognitive 
process potentially creates a new form of score. I 
will analyse the documentation produced with the 
CLA in relation to Nelson Goodman’s discussions 
(1976),  of scores and notational systems, in order 
to assess whether or not we can consider the 
documentation created to be a score, and how the 
artifact relates to the final work. 
 
The creation of an electronic score was one of the 
motivations for Cunningham in the development of 
Life Forms. As long ago as 1968 he was hoping to 
develop “an electronic notation…that is three-
dimensional” (Cunningham, 1980).  Notation has 
huge benefits in terms of documenting details, and 
Cunningham envisaged a program that would allow 
him to create his work through a computer, 
cataloguing every feature, and generating a 
detailed record. Dance does not have a widely 
used notational system. Whilst there have been 
notational languages developed such as Laban and 
Benesh notation, these are used only in specific 
environments. They require specialised training, 
meaning that companies must employ experts in 
order to document or re-stage works. This is time-
consuming and costly, and therefore not common 
practice outside of classical ballet, or specific 
historical projects. The ease of video recording also 
potentially hindered the development of these 
notations, as choreographers are able to document 
movement for memory and archiving in a fast and 
cost-effective manner. 
 
Life Forms introduced the computer as an active 
agent in the choreographic process. This is an 
important ontological shift. Both Life Forms and the 
CLA play active roles in the development of 
movement, albeit in different ways. The manner in 
which movement is generated on a screen, and 
enacted by dancers raises questions about the 
nature of embodiment. This approach is in direct 
contradiction with other widely used choreographic 
methods. Contemporary dance choreography often 
relies heavily on improvisation, usually working with 
an idea or set of rules, choreographers often 
encourage an approach that is unconcerned with 
shape, but rather explores what the body creates in 
response to a stimulus. This approach has 
developed from the choreographic models and 
theories created by Rudolph Laban at the start of 
the 20th Century. One of the main concerns of 
Laban’s approach was ‘effort’, which he describes 
as “the inner impulses from which movement 
originates” (in Block & Kissell, 2001). If these inner 
impulses are not manifested straight to movement 
but documented and used as a stimulus, a different 
mode of creation occurs. This is potentially the 
same as the process of writing in a notebook, and 
using the notes to inspire movement. However, the 
limitations of the language available on the CLA, 
and the way in which the program animates the 
images means that the computer controls the 
outcome, and is therefore autonomous in a way 
that the notebook is not.  
 
The nature of embodiment is also important in the 
analysis of my second example: The Digital Dance 
Archives (DDA) are the result of an AHRC funded 
collaboration between the University of Surrey and 
Coventry University. It offers new ways to search 
for documentations, such as films and 
photographs. The archives exist online and are 
available to the public. The documentation of dance 
challenges the form’s identifying feature of 
ephemerality. This issue is particularly relevant as 
we increasingly watch dance online. Watching 
performances on the Internet challenges the 
ontological significance of ‘liveness’ endorsed by 
McFee. The temporality of performance is replaced 
by the potential for eternal replication through a 
screen. But does this provide access to the ‘work’? 
This poses the question: If we have only seen a 
recording of a performance, can we claim to have 
seen the work? Peggy Phelan suggests that 
performance cannot be documented, and that if it is 
it becomes something other than performance 
(Phelan 1993). However Philip Auslander, claims 
that films of live works can be considered 
performances. This is due to the fact that they also 
exist physically only in the moment of enactment, 
and are therefore as significantly ephemeral as live 
performance (Auslander 2008). This affects the 
way in which we consider the relationship between 
the film and the work, and undermines the 
importance of live performance as a fundamental 
feature of dance. 
 
However, it is the specificities of the archive search 
functions that are of particular interest in this paper.  
The user is able to select a shape from an image; 
the program will then search the archive for similar 
shapes. This way of relating to dance, post-
performance, reveals the significance of shape and 
further challenges the status of live instantiation as 
the primary mode of existence for dance. 
Furthermore, archived footage and images provide 
a practical use in the identification and re-staging of 
works, meaning that they fulfill some of the 
functions of a score.   
2.1. The choreographic language agent 
The CLA comprises two screens and a spherical 
mouse, which senses the movement of the hand in 
three-dimensions. The process starts with the user 
communicating choreographic ideas by inputting 
words and diagrams, which appear on the right-
hand screen. The user forms a “sentence written in 
a language known to this tool.”(Downie, 2009). The 
Creative Computing and the Re-Configuration of Dance Ontology 
Hetty Blades 
224 
agent then uses this sentence to form an 
animation. The movement is visualised by the 
agent. It works by animating the specific points that 
constitute the dancer’s body parts and correspond 
to points in space, as well as the dancer’s 
kinesphere (Downie, 2009). The visualisation 
makes no explicit reference to the human body. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:: The Choreographic Language Agent 
animating a diagram 
 
The CLA is certainly not the first or only example of 
software created specifically for dance; however it 
does present some unique ontological queries. 
Other experimentations with software have had 
different motivations and outcomes. For example 
Life Forms functions by creating choreography on 
human avatars which is then learned by dancers. 
This means that the movement is visualised on the 
body from the start of the process. Forsythe’s 
Synchronous Objects for One Flat Thing 
Reproduced (Forsythe 2009), aims to reveal “the 
interlocking systems of organization in William 
Forsythe’s choreography. This tool applies 
visualisation techniques to existing choreography, 
as opposed to actively contributing to material. It 
provides a form of documentation, as opposed to 
aiding creation. Each choreographer and 
programmer have specific interests in the role that 
computers can play in choreography, therefore the 
systems are often as idiosyncratic as the 
choreography. Steve Dixon points out that; “The 
development of original software and hardware 
systems by dance artists has been somewhat 
fragmentary and individual, in many ways reflecting 
the development of the dance and technology 
movement itself” (Dixon 2007). This is an important 
thing to consider when discussing ontology; we 
need to remember that individuality and subjectivity 
are active components in creativity. Although dance 
arguably possesses universal properties, such as 
movement, the way in which practitioners use 
digital technology to record, create and perform 
such properties are vast and varied. This means 
that each context poses an idiosyncratic challenge 
to dance ontology.  Whilst a particular way of using 
software may impact on the development of 
movement, it does not necessarily create 
repercussions beyond the context it exists in. For 
example, the CLA doesn’t necessarily change the 
nature of movement universally, rather it tells us 
something about the about movement generated 
using the tool. 
 
The use of the CLA raises some interesting queries 
regarding the creative process, in particular the 
creation of the art works. It raises the questions; at 
what point does a work start to exist? The point of 
creation is an ongoing ontological discussion 
(Levinson 1990 & Lamarque 2010). For example 
does a dance work exist prior to the premiere? If a 
work must be completed and ‘signed off’ through 
public instantiation, what do dancers rehearse? 
The work is envisaged, formed, rehearsed and 
discussed prior to performance. Therefore, the 
work exists – potentially just as significantly as it 
does once it is made public - albeit in an unfinished 
form. Many philosophers have tried to resolve this 
problem for various art-forms. Some scholars, such 
as Jerrold Levinson (1990) suggest that multiple 
art-forms such as musical and dance works exist 
as permanent abstract structures, which are then 
‘discovered’ by composers or choreographers. 
Another suggestion, from R.G. Collingwood is that 
works of art come into existence in the imagination 
of the artist. He claims that “a work of art may be 
completely created when it has been created as a 
thing whose only place is in the artist’s mind.” 
(Collingwood 1958). He uses the example of a 
tune, claiming that when a man makes up a tune, 
he may hum it, he may write it down, or he may 
play it on an instrument, he may even do these 
things in public. But, he claims, “these things are 
accessories of the real work”, and that “The actual 
making of the tune is something that goes on in his 
head, and nowhere else” (1958). If this is the case 
and the work comes into existence in the 
choreographer’s imagination, the images generated 
on the CLA are the first physical token of the work, 
as opposed to a by-product of the act of discovery.  
Whilst the document created is only an accessory, 
in Collingwood’s terms, it allows us to visualise 
cognition, bringing the significance of the artist’s 
imagination to the forefront of the work’s identity. 
Furthermore, if the work of art exists as soon as it 
is formed in the choreographer’s imagination, the 
significance of human enactment is called into 
question. 
 
Whilst McFee suggests that we can only encounter 
a work through physical performance, Collingwood 
says a work does not need to take any physical 
form in order to exist. The CLA however, allows the 
work to have physical form without human 
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performance. But, can we really consider computer 
images, to be a dance work? It is problematic to 
suggest that these things are as much the work as 
a performance. However, this way of understanding 
the creation of dance highlights their complex 
ontology. If we can consider these images to be a 
work, therefore suggesting that computers are able 
to quantify the ontological properties of dance, the 
impact on the concept of dance is vast.  Outside of 
instantiation works exist purely as mental entities, 
therefore it is potentially appropriate to consider 
them to be created as such. If we are to go down 
this route of enquiry, the CLA can be viewed as 
generating a text, or score from which the 
performance is made. Like the creation of a play or 
musical work the transition from imagination to 
instantiation is mediated through a physical object. 
Traditional Laban notation scores are created 
alongside the work, or once it has been finished. 
Notators attend rehearsals and performances in 
order to document the details of the movement. 
The CLA therefore offers a different form of score, 
as it not only exists first, but dictates the 
development of the work. 
 
Mark Downie suggests that the program creates “a 
new form of dance notation – one which aids the 
choreographer in generating dance movements 
rather than in recording existing movements” 
(2009).  But can this abstract document really be 
considered a score, correlating to both work and 
performance? Nelson Goodman states that a score 
“has as its primary function the authoritative 
identification of a work from performance to 
performance” (Goodman 1976). There is no 
requirement that a notation is able to be read and 
understood by everyone, musical scores only serve 
to identify works by those able to read music. 
Similarly Laban notation is only readable by a few 
professionals, yet still serves as an identifying 
score. So when Goodman claims that it must serve 
to identify a work, he does not mean that it must 
share recognizable aesthetic features. Therefore, 
even if only one person (the one who created the 
images and subsequently the work), is able to use 
the documentation to establish whether or not a 
certain set of movements is indeed a performance 
of a specific work, it may serve as a form of score. 
However, scores rely on formal notation systems. 
Goodman points out that: 
Scores and performances must be so 
related that in every chain where each step 
is either from score to compliant 
performance or from performance to 
covering score or from one copy of a score 
to another correct copy of it, all 
performances belong to the same work and 
all copies of scores define the same class 
of performances. (Goodman 1976) 
This stringent relationship between the CLA 
animation and the resulting performance seems 
unlikely. The nature of the system means that 
subjective interpretation plays an important role in 
the creative process. The animations are 
interpreted by the choreographer or dancers. This 
movement then becomes the performance. Once 
this has occurred, the people involved would 
theoretically be able to determine, through 
analysing the sketches whether they represented 
one work or another. However, this would be reliant 
upon the recollection of the act of interpretation, 
and decoding the creative process that led from the 
sketch to the movement- as opposed to reading a 
codified notational system. 
 
Goodman points out that “not every symbol system 
with a notational scheme is a notational system” 
(Goodman 1976), but can we consider CLA as a 
notational system? A key part of Goodman’s 
distinction lies in the nature of the characters used, 
he claims that “[a] necessary condition for a 
notation, then, is character indifference [Goodman’s 
emphasis] among the instances of each character” 
(Goodman 1976). I.e. no one mark can belong to 
more than one character. This is problematic in the 
case of the CLA; the notation consists of various 
lines. These lines are developed in relation to 
specific body parts and points in space, so 
theoretically they should be able to be ‘read’ as 
corresponding mathematically and anatomically to 
movement. However, this is not how the program is 
used. The sketch feature, and the way in which the 
movement is developed from the images mean that 
these lines do not directly correlate to the 
movement that results from them. In Goodman’s 
terms then, this is not notation. It is simultaneously 
a representation of the process of creation, and 
documentation of it. In this way it is similar to a 
recording, but it documents process rather than 
product, this is the diametric opposite of Laban 
notation, which documents the final outcome. The 
images do not function in the traditional sense of a 
score, they are not created for the purpose of 
identification - such a feature would be incidental, 
rather than defining. Furthermore, a traditional 
score is reliant upon the occurrence of human 
movement, whereas this documentation serves to 
invoke such activity. What then are these images? 
Perhaps we can dismiss them off as a remnant of a 
necessary activity, to generate the significant object 
(the performance). However they do possess 
ontological importance. The physical, visual 
manifestation of the act of creation offers a new 
form of existence for a work, prior to human 
embodiment. 
 
Whilst traditionally we have understood dance 
works to be exemplified by performances, this tool 
demonstrates an ontological quandary. For 
example, if a work is developed using the CLA, the 
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sketches are created, the movement created and 
rehearsed but for some reason, never gets 
performed in public; has the work ever existed? 
This seems unlikely. Whilst we are used to the 
notion that the performance is the work, we cannot 
dismiss the relationship between these diagrams 
and the work. In the same way that the dancer is a 
crucial entity, this program is a fundamental 
component to the work, and therefore the 
performance. In fact it is the first embodiment of the 
work. If we are able to consider the work as 
existing before instantiation, these animated 
structures are ontologically crucial to the work. This 
calls into question the primary significance of the 
human body. The work is ‘embodied’ by the 
computer, in that sense that the idea of the work is 
given visible form, without the need for human 
movement. 
 
So, what does this tool reveal to us about the 
ontology of movement and the nature of 
embodiment? It is possible to suggest that the CLA 
exposes the significance of geometry and shape, 
implicating these features as defining ontological 
characteristics of movement (which a universal 
property of dance). The way, in which the tool 
functions as a stimulus, creating a shape which is 
then explored physically- contrasts to other 
choreographic approaches and tools, which aim to 
create movement from internal stimulus. 
 
This implies that dance possesses characteristics 
which are distinct from the human body. The 
shapes generated show us how movement is 
perceived and created in the mind of the 
choreographer and by the computer. The fact that 
they are not represented on a body, suggests that 
the ‘essence’ of the movement is not reliant on 
human embodiment. The human body is the final 
part of the production process, as opposed to the 
primary feature. The involvement of the computer 
reveals this by creating a visual and physical 
exemplar of the transition from thought to 
movement. However, it is also possible to suggest 
that the images are only representative of a 
prescribed outgoing, and the programme dictates 
the outcome. The autonomy of the machine sets it 
apart from a notebook. The system mediates the 
process. Unlike a video camera or Laban notation 
score, the CLA does not create records of existing 
movement but effects the movement through the 
language available. 
2.2. The Digital Dance Archives 
This ontological significance of shape is further 
revealed in examination of the Digital Dance 
Archives (DDA). The DDA are the result of one of 
many projects currently looking at creative ways to 
document and archive dance digitally. It is home to 
six collections, spanning over 100 years of British 
dance. It contains videos and images, including 
drawings from Laban’s archives. The archive 
allows users to create their own scrapbooks, tag 
and annotate sources, and search across the 
collection by selecting a colour or shape and 
looking for similar images. The ‘Pose’ search 
mechanism is of particular interest. Users can use 
the mouse to highlight part of an image and the 
search engine will return images which resemble 
the selected shape. 
 
 
 
Figure 2:: Selecting a shape for 'Pose' search on the 
Digital Dance Archives 
 
The sources returned are often stylistically very 
different to the original image used. Furthermore, 
the diagrammatic sketches from Laban’s archive 
often appear in response to a ‘Pose’ search. The 
inclusion of these drawings in the archive 
demonstrates the historical and ontological 
significance of creative products, aside from 
performances.  It is possible to select a fraction of a 
post-performance documentation, search for 
corresponding images, and end up with a 
document from prior to human enactment. This 
demonstrates the extensive temporal span of 
performance works, beyond the moment of 
instantiation, and the way in which these things 
interweave ontologically. Alternatively we are able 
to select a section of a drawing and receive photos 
from performances - making explicit the dominant 
feature of shape in movement. However this 
process diminishes the significance of the human 
body and live instantiation. The work is embodied 
(made visual) through a computer. Whilst human 
movement has occurred in order to generate some 
of the sources, theses are equal to the sources 
which merely represent movement through 
drawing. Technology creates an interesting 
paradox: it is continually moving towards enhanced 
visualisation through dimensionality - the use of 
HD, 3D and motion capture technologies are 
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Figure 3: Example of one result from previous search 
 
constantly finding new ways to take us closer to the 
‘reality’ of three-dimensionality. For example, 
researchers at Ritsumeikan University in Japan are 
using motion capture to archive traditional Noa 
theatre and movement. (Hachimura 2006) This 
approach allows us to visualise the dimensionality 
of the body, however there is currently no escaping 
the flat nature of the screen. These enhanced 
dimensions are visualised through a 2D portal. 
Furthermore, the materiality of the body is de-
centralised. We traditionally searched archives 
through historical features, extraneous to the 
movement, such as the artist’s name or the year of 
creation, however we are now able to search 
through the analysis of bodily form. This 
simultaneously draws us closer to the essence of 
movement, and further away, as the body becomes 
a two-dimensional, static image. Electronic 
visualisation removes the actual body from the 
center of focus and enquiry by prioritising the 
digtialised form. 
3. CONCLUSION 
Craig Hanks suggests that “for Heidegger 
technology is the supreme danger to man. The 
essence of technology, in the Heideggerian sense, 
presents a supreme danger because it prevents us 
from having a proper understanding of our own 
being, of our own essence.” (Hanks, 2009). 
Heidegger suggests that technology makes nature 
a “standing – reserve” (Heidegger 1977). By this he 
means that nature becomes a resource to be called 
upon, or unlocked by technology. This is potentially 
an issue in relation to the systems I have 
discussed. Does the autonomous role of 
technology reduce the body to a standing reserve, 
therefore distorting dance’s essential ontology? 
Heidegger claims that man cannot be a standing 
reserve, “Since man drives technology forward, he 
takes part in ordering and a way of revealing” 
(Heidegger 1977), because we are responsible for 
developing the technology, human beings cannot 
be seen as merely a standing reserve. However, 
can the body be considered distinct from the 
technologically driven man? The body is certainly 
re-situated within the spectrum of performative 
artifacts created by new software. The 
disembodiment of movement through visualisations 
of cognitive process demonstrates a chasm 
between the thought of movement and the actual 
event. Furthermore, the DDA demonstrates that, 
post-event, movement can once again be revealed 
as shape forms, distinct from the bodily act of 
moving. This means that the notion of embodiment 
- as involving the human body is challenged. We 
are able to see how movement can be created and 
made visual on a computer, and therefore 
embodied without the body. 
 
The various images and documents created pre 
and post performance create a broader existential 
portfolio for works. We are able to see the way in 
which performances exist as images, from their 
inception in the imagination of the choreographer to 
their eternal representation in an archive. These 
images demonstrate the way in which works 
actually exist before and after performance, 
negating the ontological compulsion of liveness. 
The live performance is reduced to one event in a 
series of processes and experiences that we are 
now able to easily view and access. The way in 
which works exist as virtual entities, before and 
after physical existence in performance, raises 
philosophical problems concerning existence and 
reality, which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, whilst virtual existence has previously 
had no physical presence, technology has provided 
us with digital visualisations of this abstract mode 
of existence, by allowing for the documentation of 
process and product. This allows us to consider the 
reality of the virtual, and dispute the assumed 
importance of the actual. 
 
Due to the way in which technology is being used 
in so many different ways by choreographers, we 
are faced with enormous multiplicity. This is 
problematic when discussing ontology. We cannot 
say that each way of using technology creates an 
ontologically distinct type of thing, as this would 
dispute the existence of an art-form labeled 
‘dance’. Dance works are types of the same thing, 
despite being made differently. We cannot claim 
that works made with the CLA, or stored on the 
DDA, are ontologically different to works made 
without digital technology, as this leads to vast and 
unmanageable subjectivity. Therefore, we must 
view these programmes as evidence of the way in 
which a work’s ontology spans more than the 
moment of live performance. This understanding 
not only continues to challenge the significance of 
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liveness as a defining ontological feature, but also 
disputes the primary importance of the human 
body, as the creation and consideration of works is 
focused towards shapes and images. We are able 
to understand these characteristics through 
visualisation, yet these methods do not necessarily 
re-configure dance, but rather re-configure our 
understanding of the form. This demonstrates 
Heidegger’s observations of technology as a tool to 
reveal and help us understand the world.  
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